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ABSTRACT 
The l i t e r a t u r e  of m i l i t a r y  soc io logy  d e a l i n g w i t h .  t h e  convergence of 
c i v i l i a n  and m i l i t a r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  modern s o c i e t y  a s s e r t s  t h a t  a l though 
s t r u c t u r a l  isomorphism may never  be a t t a i n e d ,  t h e  t r end  i s  i n  t h a t  
d i r & t i o n .  It f u r t h e r  a s s e r t s  t h a t  t h i s  hypothesized convergence i s  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by a  breaking-domi of tfie boundary between' t he .  c i v i l  and 
t h e  m i l i t a r y .  We sugges t  t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r l y .  i n  an  e r a  of a l l  vo lun tee r  
armed f o r c e s ,  which i s  t h e  emerging p a t t e r n  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  nat i .ons 
o f , t h e  wes t ,  t h e  t r end  is no l o n g e r  toward convergence and may be one 
of divergence.  Convergence can b e  seen  a s  making t h e m i l i t a r y  f u n c t i o n a l l y  
independent o f . i t s  h o s t  s o c i e t y  and i n s u l a t e d . f r o m  i t ,  whereas t h e  enforce-  
ment of more s p e c i f i c a l l y  m i l i t a r y  d e f i n i t i o n s .  of t h e  m i l i t a r y -  system 
f o r c e s  i t  t o  main ta in  open boundar ies  and e n t e r  i n t o  exchange r e l a t i o n -  
s h i p s  w i th  i t s  h o s t  s o c i e t y .  . Data . r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  rn.<li.tary. fami ly ,  o c -  . 
c u p a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  and r e sea rch .  management a r e  p re sen ted  and t h e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  both convergence and interdependence. a re .  discussed..  
i. . . 
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i The relationship between civilian and military institutions in 
industrial societies has long been of interest to sociologists. The 
military sociology of the 1960's stressed the increasing similarity 
of military and civilian sectors of American ~ociety.~ Thus; 
Janowitz (1965:17) argued that- "to analyze the contemporary military 
establishment as a social system, it is ... necessary to assume that 
for some time it has tended to display more and more of the characteris- 
tics typical of any large-scale nonmilitary bureaucracy-." At the same 
time, however, there was a recognition that common technologies, lead- 
ing to common organizational forms, could not lead to total elimination 
of the fundamental difference between that which.is military and that 
which is civilian. 
Although stressing the increasingly similar occupatfonal structures 
of civilian and military sectors (see Lang, 1964:45) and postulating 
that on the basis of these ~imilarit~es civilian and military organiza- 
tional forms must converge as well (see Grusky, 1964;84), military 
.i 
:i sociology has not asserted that total conve.rgence.~muld be achieved : 
1 .' 
j at some point, or that structural is om or phi's'^ would be achieved.. 
.J 
i Rather, the convergence function has been conceived, at mos.t, as an 
I ,  
.! asymptotic one, with military and civflian structures- becomi'ng 1 .  I - 
increasingly similar, but asymptotic failing to reach-a point of 
j intersection. (Segal and Segal, 1971; Segal, 1972). ., Other' scholars 
i in fact see the function describing civil-military conyergence as. 
I .; . 
i 
tangential rather that asymptotic.. Moskos (1970.;170), for example, i 
I suggested that "the over-two-decade-long institutional convergence 
i 
! .  - 
. . 
of t h e  armed f o r c e s  and American s o c i e t y  is  beginning t o  r e v e r s e  
i t s e l f  ... (and) t h a t  t he  m i l i t a r y  i n  t h e  post-Vietnam per iod  $11 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  d ive rge  along a v a r i e t y  of dimensions from t h e  m i n -  
s t ream of developments i n  t h e  g e n e r a l  soc ie ty" .  A t h i r d  p o s i t i o n  
posi%s l i m i t s  on t h e  asymptot ic  f u n c t i o n ,  implying t h a t  r a t h e r  than 
c o n s t a n t l y  converging 'under  t h e . f o r c e  of t echno log ica l  development, . 
m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  forms w i l l  r each  a  p o i n t  p r i o r  
t o  i n t e r s e c t i o n  a t  which f u r t h e r  convergence w i l l  be  prec luded  by 
the  b a s i c  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  m i l i t a r y  and t h e  c i v i l i a n .  . Thus, 
p o i n t i n g  out  t h a t  even i n  h i g h l y  t echno log ica l  war fa re ,  convent iona l  
m i l i t a r y  u n i t s  and the  t r a d i t i o n a l  m i l i t a r y  r o l e  must be maintained,  
and t h a t  i n  an  age of d e t e r r e n c e  t h e  management of v io l ence  i s  s t i l l  
t h e  prime m i l i t a r y  miss ion ,  Janowitz  (1971:21) a rgues  t h a t  " the  
narrowing d i s t i n c t i o n  between m i l i t a r y  and nonmi l i t a ry  bureaucrac ies  
. . 
can never  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  e l i m i n a t i o n  of fundamental o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
d i f f e r ences . "  Most r e c e n t l y , ~ M o s k o s  (1973) has  sugges ted  t h a t  t h e  
I 
m i l i t a r y  may a t  t h e  same time be convergent w i th  and d ive rgen t  from 
I c i v i l i a n  s o c i e t y  depending on t h e  empi r i ca l  i n d i c a t o r s  used: a 
i 
i 
1 model t h a t  h e  l a b e l s  "segmented" o r  "p lura ln- .  Divergence w i l l  be  
! . . 




t e c h n i c a l  suppor t  agencies .  We s h a l l  propose below an  a l t e r n a t i v e  
framework f o r  viewing t h e  convergence problem. 
C 
THE TWO FACES OF CONVERGENCE 
It must be noted a t  t h e  o u t s e t  t h a t  s c h o l a r s  concerned wi th  the  
convergence phenomenon d i f f e r  n o t  on ly  i n  t h e  degree t o  which they  
s e e  convergence occur ing  bu t  a l s o  i n  t h e i r  p r o j e c t i o n s  of  what t h e  
I 
I social system would look like if convergence were in fact to take place. 
The major area of disagreement is on whether the civil or the military 
will dominate the-merged structure. Two opposing positions are 
apparent here. On the one hand, Lasswell's garrison-state hypothesis, 
which was the first major projection of civil-military convergence in 
modern American social science;sees the development of new military 
technologies that make the risk of being a civilian in wartime almost 
as great as that of being a military man leading to a merged civil- 
military social structure dominated by military men in pursuit of 
military objectives (see Lasswell, 1962). On the other hand, the 
argunent is made that contrary to Lasswell's position; the convergence 
that has taken place thus far has led not to a militarization of 
civilian institutions but rather to a civilianization of the military 
institutions (Biderman and Sharp, 1968 : '397). It seems premature. at 
this point to assert that one or the other of these positions is 
correct. Such a decision presumes that convergence has already been 
demonstrated. However, the convergence phenomenon today has the status 
of an interesting hypothesis iri military sociology, not that of an 
assumption. We shall therefore be concerned'here simply with the 
horse, and leave the cart for another occasion, remaining mindful that 
if convergence is demonstrated, it cannot be interpreted either as a 
demonstration of civil ascendency over the military or vice versa 
. Z 
without additional analysis. 
I 
i 
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! MODELS OF CONVERGENCE 
The s t u d y ' o f  c i v i l - m i l i t a r y  convergence i s  burdened by b0t.h. - ,
conceptua l  and o p e r a t i o n a l  ambigui ty.  Two s c h o l a r s  u s ing  t h e  term 
convergence may w e l l  mean ve ry  d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g s ,  and a th i . rd ,  i n t e r e s t e d  
j . i n  f h e  r e c i p r o c a l  i n t e r p e n e t r a t f  on of the.  c i v i l  and the .  m i l i  t a r y ,  might 
be r e f e r r i n g  t o  e i t h e r  of t h e  f i r s t  two phenomena, o r  t o  some t h i r d  
process  a l t o g e t h e r .  And two s c h o l a r s  who use  t h e  same. term and mean 
t h e  same t h i n g  by i t  may none the l e s s  come t o  d i f f e r e n t  conclusions. 
i f  one s t u d i e s  formal  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p r o p e r t i e s  and t h e  o t h e r  occupa- 
t i o n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  i n  t h e  two s e c t o r s .  
A t  t h e  conceptua l  l e v e l ,  two d i f f e r e n t  types  of r e l a t f . onsh ips  
between t h e  c i v i l  and t h e  m i l i t a r y .  need b e - s p e c i f i e d . .  It i.s necessary  
. . . . . . . . . . 
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  convergence of c i v i l i a n  and mil i . tary.  
. . 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  from t h e  in te rdependence  of these.  i n s t i t u t f o n s .  It i s  
. . . . .  
our  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e s e  two a s p e c t s  of t h e  convergence phenomenon a r e  
n e g a t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  w i t h  each o ther . .  The more, s t r u c t u r a l l y  s i m i l a r  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  is  t o  c i v i l i a n  s o c i e t y  i n  terms of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  char- 
a c t e r i s t i c s ,  occupa t iona l  s t r u c t u r e ,  e t c . ,  the more capable  i t  i s  of 
s u s t a i n i n g  i t s e l f  a s  an independent e n t i t y - w i t h o u t  dependzng on tlie 
c i v i l i a n  s e c t o r .  Hence, t h e  g r e a t e r  the.  degree  of convergence i n  
t h i s  s ense ,  t h e  more s t r u c t u r a l l y  i s o l a t e d  the armed f o r c e s  may become 
from c i v i l i a n  s o c i e t y .  The g r e a t e r  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  p laced  on such 
convergence by emphasis on pu re ly  m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  
t h e  more dependent t h e  armed f o r c e s  w i l l  be  on t h e  c i v i l i a n  s e c t o r  
f o r  non-combat a c t i v i t i e s ,  and t h e  more permeable w i l l  be t h e  
boundaries  between m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
CONVERGENCE WITH WHAT? 
One of t h e  i s s u e s  t h a t  must be faced  in d i s c u s s i o n s  of c i v i l -  
m i l i t a r y  convergence is  what t h e  m i l i t a r y - i s  hypothesized t o  be . 
converging wi th .  Is t h e  r e f e r e n t  a n  i d e a l - t y p i c a l  l a r g e  s c a l e  non- 
m i l i t a r y  *. bureaucracy,  o r  i s  i t  t h e  t o t a l  c i v i l i a n  s e c t o r  of s o c i e t y ?  
While much of t h e  r h e t o r i c  of convergence. has  heen presented  wi th  a  
view toward t h e  former kind of comparison, what seems c r u c i a l  t o  us  
i s  t h e  l a t t e r .  Whether t h e  US Army i s  s t r u c t u r a l l y  l i k e  General 
Motors may be i n t e r e s t i n g ,  bu t  i t  is l e s s  impor tan t  t han  t h e  degree 
t o  which t h e  U.S. Army can provide  a l l  e s s e n t i a l  s e r v i c e s  i n t e r n a l l y .  
To t h e  degree t h a t  a m i l i t a r y  i n s t i t u t i o n  s t r u c t u r a l l y  becones s e l f -  
s u f f i c i e n t ,  i t  a l soL  beco~ues s t r u c t u r a l l y  independent from i t s  hos t  
s o c i e t y .  
"FA-WILY ECOLOGY' AS AN INTERFACE PROCESS 
. >',>-.:; < . . . -. 
,, 4 .. . ,T;i~.ie ,;axZe . i , -Ls.; i ;bLl"f is -in., &ue i ,~~ i i iL . , s ;~~$e~y-  , ~ < L a L . ,  .be.- seel, .as 
he lp ing  t o  b r idge  t h e  boundary- between m i l i t a r y . a n d  c f y i l i a n  s e c t o r s .  
. . 
I Bramson (1971),  f o r  example, has d i scussed  t h e  way t h e  Examination 
t 
and Induc t ion  Center ,  under a system of c o n s c r i p t i o n  and en l i s tmen t ,  
1 
1 
4 served  both t o  b r i n g  i n t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  people who d id  n o t  want t o  be 
i 
i t h e r e ,  and t o  keep ou t  people who d i d  b u t  who were de f ined  by t h e  
a 
4 .I m i l i t a r y  a s  unacceptable  f o r  any of a number of r ea sons .  I n  a  more 
long-term sense ,  t h e  family can a l s o  be vzewed a s  an  i n t e r f a c e  i n s t i -  
i t u t i o n ,  g i v i n g  t h e  man who spends his working .hours  on a m i l i t a r y  base  
j 
an anchor p o i n t  i n  c i v i l i a n  s o c i e t y .  The company town of t h e  e a r l y  
t w e n t i e t h  cen tu ry  prevented t h e  f ami ly  from s e r v i n g  such -a  boundary 
f u n c t i o n  by i n c o r p o r a t i n g  i t  i n t o  t h e  company. system.: The. t rend  i n  . . 
i t h e  American economy, however, has  been away from'-company towns, with. 
4 
the family operating as a more autonomous system entering into ex- 
change relationships with economic organizations. With the movement 
away from company towns, the company and its host community have be- 
come more interdependent (see Parsons, 1960). 
a, 
The relationship between the military as a corporate entity 
and the families of its emfloyees has gone in the opposite direction 
from that of civilian economic organization. The military family did 
not really exist historically. Most soldiers were not married except 
for more senior officers, and their wives and families could only 
rarely live with them on a military post if they were married. Women 
living in communities outside the base,. and in some cases, female 
employees provided certain marital functions (Little, 1971). Until 
the beginning of World War 11, this was true except during times of 
national mobilization. Even then, families were far away and little 
was provided for their support. 
During the mass mobilization of World War I1 and in the cold war 
! period after that, large numbers of married men were brought into 
the military and for the first time assistance to families in terms 
of allowance and limited medical care was made available. Because 
of housing shortages on post, most families lived in cities, but the 
. . 
; 
1 .  majority of economic 'transactions still occurred off post. For many 
military men their daily trip to the post for their duties resembled 
1 the daily trip to the factory or office for others. Increasingly 
1 
1 the soldier was a family man and community member. True, he moved 
more than others and his collar was green or brown rather than blue 
or white, but there was considerable parallelism in structure and 
interdependence in activities between the military and civilian sectors. 
But what.about.the present-day military family? How is it 
similar to or distinct from its civilian counterpart? First, theL 
trends in assistance and support to the family which have come to 
characterize the post World War I1 period have continued and expand- *. 
ed in scope. To attempt to measure this trend, one could consider 
a wide range of empirical indicators. For example, one might want 
to look at the change in: family allotments (eligibility and amount), 
medical care for dependents (on and off post), welfare services 
(such as the Army Community Service), provision of on-post consumer 
goods facilities (PX and commissary), or entertainment facilities 
(clubs, athletic facilities, movie theaters, etc.). 
As the data presented in Figure 1 show, the percentage of 
.......................... 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
.......................... 
families in military-owned and controlled housing across time has 
shown a constant upward trend. Through the decade of the 19601s, 
there was a relatively stable plateau varying between 23 and 26 per- 
cent of military families. This was an increase from the decade of 
the 1950's, and another major increase is projected in the 1970's. - 
. Were data available £or earlier periods, the change would probably 
- be even more striking. The trend is clear, however, and would be 
.. 
upward in the future even if no new housing were to be built--at 
least until the number of personnel and their families decreases to 
its low point in the all volunteer army. Thus, the family has been 





1 given the decrease in civilian company to~ms, were we to graph 
difference scores rather than raw percentages-, the. curve would be . .  . 
I 
changed by a considerable power. Equally important is. that 75 per 
cent of the FY'l972 building program was devoted to enlfsted rather 
thafi'officer housing. This too is in direct contrast to civilian 
corporations which, to the extent that they- see to the. housfng needs 
of their personnel, seem to confine their concerns to management 
rather than assembly-line strata (Jennings, 1970). Howeyer, one could 
also note that as the military installation comes to be structured more 
I 
like a civilian community by providing community facilities such as 
housing it becomes less dependent upon a civclian environment. 
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
Much of the argument on ciyil-military convergence has been 
concerned with occupational structures. Early reports indicated 
increasing similarity between the military and the civilian in this 
regard (see Lang, 1964), but made little comment on ttie implicati.ons 
of that similarity. However, data presented both by Biderman and 
Sharp (1968) and by \*loo1 (1968) suggests that tliis convergence is not 
taking place. The former authors see important limitations on the 
"transfer value" of military skills to civilian life, and the latter 
points out that the military remains a specialized structure, with 
large numbers of men engaged in activities that are only slightly 
represented in the civilian occupational structure. 
Wool p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  remains a  very  s p e c i a l i z e d  
s t r u c t u r e  w i th  markedly d i f f e r e n t  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  of i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  . .  . 
c a t e g o r i e s  of occupat ions.  These d i f f e r e n c e s  i nc lude  t h e  absence 
+ - of s a l e s  and farm workers i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y ;  t h e  concomitant absence . 
i of gtound combat t roops  i n  t h e  c i v i l i a n  s t r u c t u r e ;  t h e  much g r e a t e r  
number of mechanics i n  t he  m i l i t a r y  i n  comparison t o  t h e  c i v i l i a n  
s e c t o r ;  and the  absence of l a r g e  numbers of non-farn? s e r v i c e ,  opera- 
t i v e s  and l a b o r e r s  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y .  I n  s h o r t ,  a s  can be seen  'from 
I 
! Table 1, t h e r e  is  by no means a s t r u c t u r a l  convergence between t h e  
I 
1 
two s e c t o r s .  
Table 1 about  h e r e  
------------------ 
In  very  broad terms,  t h e r e  have been some s i m i l a r  t r e n d s  i n  
t h e  c i v i i i a n  and m i l i t a r y  s e c t o r s :  i n c r e a s e s  i n  s k i l l e d  and tech-  
n i c a l  jobs ;  decreases  i n  combat and farm occupat ions ;  i n c r e a s e s  i n  
wh i t e - co l l a r  j obs ;  growth of t h e  t e r t i a r y  s e c t o r s .  The d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
of s p e c i f i c  jobs i n  t h e  two s e c t o r s  r e m a i n . d i f f e r e n t ,  and most of 
t h e  change t h a t  d id  occur took p l a c e  between;World War I1 and t h e  
mid-1950's. Thus, we can a s s e r t  n e i t h e r  t h a t  t h e  t r end  toward con- 
vergence i n  occupat iona l  s t r u c t u r e  is  a  long-standing h i s t o r i c a l  
one, nor  t h a t  i t  i s . c o n t i n u i n g  i n t o  t h e  f u t u r e .  
Graph 2 p r e s e n t s  a b s o l u t e  d i f f e r e n c e  s c o r e s  between t h e  pro- 
p o r t i o n  of t h e  c i v i l i a n  l a b o r ,  f o r c e  and t h e  p ropor t ion  of t h e  m i l i -  
t a r y  l a b o r  f o r c e  i n  t h r e e  broad c a t e g o r i e s  of occupat ions:  whi te  
collar (excluding farm and combat occupations); blue collar (ex- 
, .  . - 
eluding farm and combat occupations); farm and combat occupations. 
This last category might be seen as the declining primary sector 
Graph 2 about here 
of the civilian and military industrial organization, respectively. 
At the time of the Civil War, 90.4 per cent of our active duty force 
was categorized in combat occupations. By 1960, this figure had 
fallen to 16.3'per cent. Less dramatically, at the time of the 
Civil War, 53 per cent of the male civilian labor force was engaged 
in farm occupations as against 6.3 per cent in 1960. Despite a 
continuing decline in the primary sector, and despite the fact that 
between'  he Civii -;Car ana i360 ,the ,miii.rrary over.took-and surpassed. 
1 
the civilian sector in the proportion of its labor force involved 
in administrative and clerical occupations, the difference between 
per cent in blue collar occupations in the two sectors has remained 
relatively constant in the post-World War I1 years,.after converging 
pre-World War I. The difference between per cent in white collar 
occupations, after declining prior to World War 11, is now increasing 
The consideration of occupational convergence between the 
military and civilian sectors raises again the problem.of system 
boundaries. Lang (1972) sees the primacy of combat orientations 
as the basis for a military career diminishing as the need for per- 
. .  . - 
sonnel in the tertiary sector increases. This would, in theory, . 
reduce the discrepancy between that which is military and that 
which is civilian (cf. Segal, 1972). Because of the inertia of 
traditional concepts of the military career, however, the military 
institution has difficulty fitting its skill distribution to its 
needs. Lang (1972) suggests three alternative means of dealing with 
the problem: lateral recruitment; use of paraprofessionals; and contract. 
The first two involve bringing people who are not military profes- 
sionals into the structure of military management, and would probably 
contribute to structural convergence. The latter defines as outside 
the military sphere tasks that are not performed by military person- 
nel, thereby asserting system boundaries and contributing to inter- 
. &&j.eud.el~C!e. La<t3i& eilLyy iLas IaiieLi ,LxL?c" dis*$& iLi a&:ie pfis <-i{otid . .: . 
War 11 years. The paraprofessional model is approximated today only 
in the Air Force, and there only at junior grades. The contract model, 
by contrast, has traditionally been, and continues to be, the major 
means by which the military secures services. With the transition to 
an all volunteer force, and with a diminution in the size of the active 
duty force, we might anticipate that an increasing number of tasks will 
be defined as non-military and outside of the boundaries of the military 
system, and will be performed by civilians on a contract basis. In- 
s 
terestingly,-Lang (1973), argues that the boundary between the civilian 
and the military has already "been blurred to a point where it hardly 
exists any longer. 
Our own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  d a t a  i s  t h a t  t h e  boundary is  indeed 
d i s t i n c t ,  and t h a t  i n  a n  e r a  of  s h r i n k i n g  uniformed personnel  r e seu rces ,  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  w i l l  i n c r e a s i n g l y  d ive rge  from c i v i l i a n  occupa t iona l  
s t r u c t u r e  and toward i t s  primary miss ion  - combat r ead ines s  - t h e  -. 
i 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  complex technology of combat notwi ths tanding .  The i m -  
p l i c a t i o n s  of t h i s  l a c k  of s t r u c t u r a l  convergence appear t o  be i n  t h e  
cons ide ra t ion  of t h e  i n c r e a s e d  c o n t a c t  and i n t e r p e n e t r a b i l i t y  t h a t  must 
e x i s t  f o r  t h e  m i l i t a r y  t o  con t inue  t o  e x i s t .  The c i v i l i a n  s e c t p r  is  
s t i l l  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  manufacture of c l o t h i n g ,  equipment, bombs, 
weapons;tools and s o  on f o r  t h e  m i l i t a r y .  Food must be grown by 
t h e  c i v i l i a n  s e c t o r  and s o l d  t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y .  Se rv i ces  f o r  m i l i t a r y  
personnel ,  such a s  ba rbe r  shops ,  a u t o  mechanics, and B i b l e  salesmen, 
must be provided from t h e  c i v i l i a n  s e c t o r  (al though t h e  m i l i t a r y  
n n n t i n . . n m  t n  n r n ~ r < d r \  - 4 n i m t n r m  r l n o t r r r c  o n d  d n n t 4 n 4 - 7  F m -  i c o  - , r r o o o r ; . l \  
r " . r b * r . u L u  L" ( r L " .  -UC ...II..L"LL* &,, ..*I.' ...b,.?-LA" LU L V L  A L U  .yb*UV.*~*L*/ . 
A l l  of t h i s  d i c t a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  must be a l a r g e  amount of i n t e r a c t i o n  
between t h e  m i l i t a r y  and c i v i l i a n  sphe res  f o r  t h e  former ' s  cont inued 
ex i s t ence .  A u s e f u l  example of what a completely independent m i l i t a r y  
might look  l i k e  can be provided by looking  a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  i n s t a l l a -  
t i o n s  i n  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r i e s ,  where most equipment and s u p p l i e s  a r e  s e n t  
from t h e - U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and t h e r e  is  minimal c o n t a c t  between t h e  
m i l i t a r y  personnel  and t h e  ind igenous  economy. Here one w i l l  f i n d  
l i t t l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  happenings of t h e  f o r e i g n  count ry  
I 
and t h e  American m i l i t a r y ,  which f o r  a l l  i n t e n t s  and purposes,  i s  
f u n c t i o n a l l y  independent by v i r t u e  of i t s  be ing  a b l e  t o  f u l f i l l  i ts  
.! 
! .  
i 
! 
own needs (see Wolf, 1969). It appears, then, as. if the relative lack of 
convergence between the occupational structures of the civilian and 
military structures means that there is still a great deal of contact 
between the two, and that the military in this country has not become' 
. .
independent of the civilian work force and economy. 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Technology has been postulated to be the motor that runs. the 
convergence machine, and research and development (P, and D) is the 
handmaiden of technology. Indeed, given the dependence of a wide 
range of organizations, the military among themF on modern tech- 
i 
nology, we might expect civil-military convergence in the R and D 
area even if it occurred nowhere else. 
Recently sociologists interested in organizational analysis 
L 
have used an open-system approach..in studying the jjlternal structure 
q : .  . 
.-i 
n and functioning of organfzations. ~liaracteri'sti'cs: of the. open- 
: 
4 system perspective are a reconceptualization of organizational 
j 
boundaries as problematic. and an emphasis on external variables, as 
$ . . 
-J 
.1 
3 the primary agents of social change (Hirsch., 1973; Katz and Kahn, 1966) .. 
i ' 
I' In particular, Thompson (1967) argues. that the structure of all organi-za- 
'.i 
4 
3 tions is designed to protect the'production or~technologi.ca1 core from 
I 
'3 
environmental influences. Therefore, it w2ll be non-production units 
. . 
'.j such as marketing, distribution, and research-and development which 3 
i ; : will be involved in exchanges with. the environment, The key. aspects 
4 
i ..I 
: .  of these boundary-spanning roles are obtaining intelligence on 
.t 




on the relative merits of product innovations, and to carry out 
policy decisions in sales, distribution, and product developmeiit ' 
i 
and production (Hirsch, 1973). The primary characteristics attributed 
to the environment in this approach are its complexity and relative 
, 
unpredictability. This environment includes, for military as well as 
for civ2lian industrial organizations, rapidly changing technology 
and 'demands for organizational output. Research and development is 
most commonly seen as an organizational attempt to manage the un- 
certainty posed by a complex and changing environment through predic- 
I 
tion and control of inilovation and demand. The military as well as 
civilian and other governmental organizations engages in research and 
3 development in response to environmental threats to organization1 
! 
J control over the production process (in a broad sense). The simple 
t 
convergence hypothesis would therefore predict that the military 
organization would increasingly resemble other organizations in re- 
search and development expenditures as a proportion of total resources, 
in undertaking more non-military-specific research-especially in 
. \ 
i management and other general skills and techniques., and that the amount 
of research done internally (not contracted out to other organizations) 
4 would approach that of the comparison organizations. -1 
4 . What are aspects of the R&D process which mfght be relevant to the ,\ 
I 
i convergence hypothesis? Four key parameters might be the number and 1 
I 
i distribution of manpower resources devoted to R&D, similar measures for 
1 
1 
j financial resources, fields of study- within which researcl~is under- 
! taken, and the organization of research, especially- the distribution 
? 




i .  . ' y. j 
against which to test convergence might be ci'vilian government agencies 
i 
I 
or'civilian private enterprises. It is necessary to establish both 
theoretically and empirically the position bf these benchmarks in 
order to demonstrate convergence by the military. 
What would be the consequences for interaction of the military 
with its environment if convergence wit$ one or another of the 
civilian models were demonstrated? To the extent that the civilian 
organization is autonomous in its research activitfes and to the extent 
that the military converged with that model, military R&D could operate 
autonomously of its environment. To the extent that military R&D 
conducted in-house, employs only military research personnel, allots 
a reasonable (in comparison with other organizations) amount of re- 
sources to research, and covers all relevant or necessary fields of 
inquiry, military R&D is self-contafned and needs, little or no fnter-- 
. . 
action with most civilian research-related organizations. to carry out 
its functions. 
' Figure- 3 presents mean indices of dissijni'larity- for R&D ex- 
. . 
penditures as a proportion of the total budgec among the Amerfcan 
Figure 3 about here 
v----vT- 
armed services (computed for each pair of services and averaged), 
for the Department of Agriculture and the ~epartment of Health, 
Education and Welfare as civilian governmental agencies for comparative 
purposes, and between the. armed services and the civilian agencies 
(computed for each service-civilian agency pair and averaged). It 
is clear that the two governmental agencies are more dissimilar 
from each other than the three armed services are among themselves. 
- 3  
Moreover, the secular trend among the armed services seems to be 
toward greater similarity, whereas the trend between HEW and Agri- 
culture seems to be toward greater dissimilarity, with the excep- 
tion of 1969. Most importantly, dissimilarity is greatest in the 
military-civilian comparisons, and this dissimilarity does not seem 
to have decreased through the decade of the 1960's. 
In the R and D field, the boundary maintenance problem can be 
approached by considering the degree to which the military conducts 
such activities in-house, rather than having it done by outside con- 
tractors. . The former model more closely approximates the activities 
of civilian enterprises that are highly dependent on technological 
development, and hence might be seen as contributing to structural 
convergence. Carrying out R and D activities on a contract basis . . 
contributes to a stricter definition of the division of labor 
between military and civilian sectors, and hence mitigates against 
convergence and reflects interdependence. 
While there are differences among the branches of the American 
military and fluctuations over time in the degree to which R and D 
r 
activities are carried out in-house, no clear case can be made for 
convergence, and a mild case can be made for interdependence. The 
Air Force, which through the decade of the 1960's grew from having , 
the smallest R and D obligations relative to its budget among the 
services to having the greatest; performed about 13 per cent of its 
. *. 
R and D activity in-house at both the beginning and the end of the 
decade, with fluctuations in between. The Navy experienced similar over- 
all stability, although the proportion of its total R&D budget which was 
spent within the organization was more than 30 per cent throughout the 
ten year period. The Army, on the other hand, was the only service to 
show a secular trend in these data. It decreased its internal R and 
D activity from 40.7 per cent of its total R and D effort in 1960 to 
34.5 per cent in .1969. The comparison organizations, HEW and the 
Department of Agriculture, show an intermediate picture. The latter 
conducted most research within the organization, drawing to a much 
smaller extent on non-governmental resources, while the former showed 
a moderate decline in in-house research as a proportion of the total 
. R and D budget, from about 26 per cept to about 19 per cent. While it 
is impossible to conclusively demonstrate either convergence or 
divergence from these data, the relatively &mall total amount of in- 
house research conducted by the Navy and the Air Force and the decrease 
in the amount conducted by the Army are suggestive of military-society 
interchange and interdependence. 
f' 
i 
Table 2 about here 
j 
DISCUSSION 
Where previous discussions of the civil-military convergence I 
phenomenon.have tended to view such convergence as contributing to 
the wqeability of the boundary of the mi'litary system, we suggest 
' 
- # 
that the greater degree of structural convergence, the less dependent 
the military is on its host society, and the more insulated it may 
become from civilian sensibilities (see Moellering, 1973). Empirical 
indicators of structural convergence of civilian and military sectors 
examined here do not in the aggregate support the hypothesized con- 
vergence. By attempting to bring the pattern maintafn2ng functions 
of the family within the military system, for example, the rnili.tary 
is becoming more structurally similar to the civilian community and is 
therefore becoming a more closed systen. .The continuing dissimilarity 
?i 
of the civilian and military occupational structures and the continuing 
t .  reliance of the military on civilian R & D activities, however, do 
indicate a lack of structural convergence and the concomitant necessity 
of the military to maintain itself as a more open system. 
5 
The continued lack of convergence between civilian and military 
occupational structures, maintaining the military's need for civilian 
g 
.? 
.$ employees and services, and the handling of a good deal of the research 
: 
: and development of technological and managerial skills on a contract 
I 
1 
i rather than an intra-mural basis seems to suggest a strengthening of 
4 
f 
the distinction between what is military and what is civilian through 
j .  
1 
; .  the mechanism of differentiation in function. By more clearly defining 
the boundary.between the military and the civilian, the mi1itary.i~ able 
to maintain itself as a more open system. Where Lang (1973) sees ,a 
! 
i 
blurring of the civil-military boundary associated with increased 
military dependence on civilian expertise, we see a reaffirmation, in 
the -&rent decade, .of a traditional division of labor that perhaps did 
get blurred in the early 1960's. It might be hypothesized that a healthy 
relationship between the military institution and the democratic society 
it protects seems to require that the military function be narrowly 
defined so that the military is functionally dependent upon civilian 
institutions which can, in turn, benefit from military- sponsorship. It 
, may be that under an all-volunteer system it is especially important for 
1 
the military to self-consciously integrate itself into civilian society, 
and that a clearer definition of the boundaries of the military system 
i 
must be developed precisely so that the military institution can be 
i maintained as an open system (Janowitz, 1973). On the other hand, others, 
! 
I 
most notably the critics of the "military-industrial complex" have argued l .  
that this type of symbiotic relatipnship, instead of being healthy, 
creates.a degree of interdependence with civilian and military goals so 
f 
intertwined that military (and political) policy is at least partly 
dictated by corporate needs and vice versa. Ei.ther relationship could 
.i 
i be conceived as injurious to democratic values and processes. An in- 1 : 
I 
I sulated military, able to function by. itself, could possibly be in a 
!. .7 
position to operate independently either withfn this country or on'the 
i 
I international scene. The interdependent military, conversely-, raises 
i 
t 
i . ; . *. .a 
7 
j the possibility of military activities, still not controlled by the 
nation as a whole, but by some form of power elite. In either..event, 
the exact nature of the civil-military interface must be made explicit 
if questions such as these are to be answered. 
/. 
i From this perspective, Moskos' (1973) "segmental" model of 
convergence, while conceptualizing military personnel systems as 
evidence for divergence from the civilian occupational structure, has 
different consequences for the problem of interdependence. The combat 
army, as the traditional nucleus of military operations, has become 
increasingly mission oriented, and wholly staffed by personnel in 
uniform trained in combat specialities. It is here that divergence 
from civilian society takes place. The support agencies, by contrast, 
in an era of fewer enlistees and no conscripts, may become increasingly 
dependent on civilian employees or on services performed contractually 
by civilian organizations. Alternatively, one may view the segmental 
model in terms of two armies: a combat army-, oriented to the combat 
mission and structurally di~ergent from civilian society., ,and.a'support . . 
army, similar in structure to civilian institutions. (Hauser, 1973). The. 
combat army in this case would be functionally dependent on the support 
army rather than on the civilian sector, and thus its relationship 
to civilian society would be at one remove. A similar phenomenon arises 
with regard to the military family. At the level of complex organizations., 
i 
there is structural divergence in comparison to corporations and company 
housing and other services for employees and their families. However, 
the military installation represents a structural. cbn+ergence with. 
i 
i 1  
i . D  
I regard to the facilities and processes found in civilian communities 
(see Clark,-1968). Increasing incorporation of the entire family,into 
i 
a situation, as on most military bases, where military supervised and 
; 
controlled institutions mediate in the soldier's contact ~ 5 t h  the 
civiiian sector, removes the individual aspects of the military-civilian 
interface and leaves a situation in which the actors are not individuals' 
but organizations -- for instance, mflitary procurement offices and 
civilian supply corporations instead of individual consumer and retailer. 
Thus civil-military interdependence is increased at the institutional 
level but decreased at the level of the individual soldier and his 
family. Wi~ether these relationships at one remove between the military 
and the surrounding society present threats to civilian ascendancy and 
3 control or increase high-lev21 military recogni.tion of and adjustment 
j 
4 to dependence on the civilian sphere is another question which., at present, 
remains unresolved. 
FOO'IXOTES 
. .  # 
'me d a t a  f o r  1961-1968 come from U.S. Department of Defense ~ n n u i l  * 
Reports  f o r  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  f i s c a l  y e a r s .  The percentage  r e p r e s e n t s  
t h e  p ropor t ion  of m i l i t a r y  f a m i l i e s  i n  adequate  family housing u n i t s  
owned and c o n t r o l l e d  by t h e  m i l i t a r y .  The number of m i l i t a r y  fami- 
l ies was o p e r a t i o n a l l y  de f ined  a s  t h e  number of e v e s  l i s t e d  a s  
m i l i t a r y  dependents of t h e  t o t a l  DOD mf l i ' t a rype r sonne l . .  For .1952,  
t h e  percentage  was e s t ima ted  based on 200,000 r epor t ed  housing u n i t s  
(US DOD Annual Report ,  1952) and on an  e s t i m a t e  made of t h e  number 
of f a m i l i e s  which was based on t h e  1952 t o t a l  personnel  s t r e n g t h  
us ing  t h e  wives t o  t o t a l  pe r sonne l  r a t r o  of 196.7, a  y e a r  wi.th. s i m i -  
lar  t roop  s t r e n g t h . a n d  war mobi l iza t ion . .  For 1960, t h e  numEer of 
wives were e s t ima ted  us ing  t h e  a2ves  t o  t o t a l  personnel  r a t i o  of 
1S51-; t h e  ;.,n;;,bcr o f  L z a s l z g . a z l t s  x i s  given. i r ;  t h e  a z z n a l  re'rort.. 
For 1970, t h e  d a t a  on t h e  number of f a m i l i e s  and t h e  number of 
adequate  housing u n i t s  came from US House hear i j lgs  (_1972; 106) .  For 
1971, t h e  number of housing u n i t s  a r e  from US House hea r ings  (IFid.) 
and t h e  number of f a m i l i e s  were e s t ima ted  based on t h e  r a t i o  of 
f a m i l i e s  t o  personnel  i n  1970. This  probably-  underes t imates  t h e  
numbers of families--and i n c r e a s e s  t h e  p ropor t ion  given-because t h e  
r educ t ion  i n  f o r c e  between 197Q and 1971 p r o b a b l y i n v o l v e d  young, 
s i n g l e  men d ispropor t iona te ly . .  The 1976 f i g u r e  is  based on pro- 
j e c t e d  family and housing u n i t  f i g u r e s  f o r  1976 (US House, 1972: 106) .  
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White c o l l a r  
SOURCE: Wool, 1968, p. 52. 
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FIGURE 2. . D i f f e r e n c e s  between c i v i l i a n  and m i l i t a r y  s e c t o r s  
i n  p e r c e n t  of l a b o r  f o r c e  engaged i n  w h i t e  c o l l a r ,  
b l u e  c o l l a r ,  and combat/farm occupat ions .  
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FIGURE 3. Indices of dissimilarity among and between 
U.S. armed services and governmental agencies 
in R and D expenditures, 1960-1969. 
Table 1. MilitaryICivilian Occupations: 
% in Certain Jobs . . .  




Medical and Dental 






General Administrative & Clerical 7.1 
Automotive Mechanics 3.2 1.5 




I - = 
! statistics not available; believed to be less than -1% 
Source: Harold IJool, The Military specialist, Johns. Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, 1968, Page 56. 
Table 2.  I n t r amura l  R&D a s  Percent  of T o t a l  
. .  . 
R&D Obl iga t ions  
F i s c a l  . .  . . .  
Year, Army Navy Air Force A g r i c u l t u r e  HEW -
Source: Fede ra l  Funds f o r  Research., Development, and Other S c f e n t f f i . ~  
A c t i v i t i e s ,  Nat ional  Science Foundati.on, 19.6.0-.196,9, 
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